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Abstract
Using a panel data of 237 main market Malay-
sian companies during 2002 to 2011, this paper ex-
amines the influence of institutional investors on 
capital structure after implementing new corporate 
governance mechanism in Malaysia in 2001. The 
results of System GMM estimator, in contrast with 
the previous studies in Malaysia, show that there is 
a negative relationship between institutional own-
ership and capital structure. This indicates that re-
structuring corporate governance in Malaysia has 
been effective and institutional investors have be-
come more active in the market. We also find that 
institutional investors are not homogenous. The re-
sults reveal that there is a significant relationship 
only for pressure-insensitive institutions, namely 
those who have very little or no business relations 
with their investees. In addition, the findings show 
that in politically connected firms, institutional in-
vestors and especially the pressure-insensitive in-
vestors lose their monitoring power. 
Keywords: Agency costs, asymmetric informa-
tion, capital structure, corporate governance, Insti-
tutional investors
Introduction
Studies on the East Asia Financial Crisis (1997-
1998) indicate that corporate governance mecha-
nism, especially ownership structure, was not ef-
ficient enough in the affected countries including 
Malaysia (Claessens and Fan, 2002, Driffield et al., 
2007, Alba et al., 1998, Chang, 2006). This weak-
ness caused the firms to have higher debt ratios 
and increasingly dependent on banks for financ-
ing (Suto, 2003). Especially in Malaysia, the high 
dependency on debt has caused instability and ex-
cess investments before the crisis in 1997-98 (Suto, 
2003), and it is believed that this was caused by 
weak corporate governance (Suto, 2003, Nadaraja 
et al., 2011, Driffield et al., 2007).
One of the most important problem about cor-
porate governance in Malaysia and other affect-
ed countries is the low level of investment  by in-
stitutional investors (Joher et al., 2011, Claessens 
and Fan, 2002) and their passive role in the mar-
ket (Iskander and Chamlou, 2000, Claessens and 
Fan, 2002). Wahab, Zain, James, and Haron (2009) 
mention that the Asian Financial Crisis has start-
ed an increased awareness about the role of institu-
tional investors. Iskander and Chamlou (2000) and 
Samuel (1996) argue that in the developing econ-
omies, institutional investors generally represent a 
small proportion of a diversified portfolio. There-
fore, they may not be powerful enough to enforce 
efficiency, fairness, and transparency. In addition, 
it is less likely that they will have a powerful gover-
nance role in the developing countries. Especially 
in Malaysia, Suto (2003) and Thillainathan (1999) 
argues that, to escape from fiduciary responsibility, 
institutional investors had less incentive to monitor 
the firms that they hold shares.
After the crisis, the Malaysian government re-
structured the corporate governance system in the 
financial market. Based on the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG), the institutional 
investors should play an important role to guaran-
tee good corporate governance practices. Partic-
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ularly, institutional investors are expected to in-
fluence decision making in firms. The Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) 
also established the Minority Shareholders Watch-
dog Group (MSWG). The main purpose of this 
group was to encourage and support shareholder 
activism via institutional investors (Wahab et al., 
2008). As a result, institutional investors in Malay-
sia have become a very powerful and large group 
that play a very important role in corporate gover-
nance mechanism to protect the interests of minor-
ity stockholders (Hashim and Devi, 2007). For ex-
ample, the institutional investors in Malaysia hold 
about 51% of the stocks in the top 10 highest mar-
ket capitalizations of firms listed on Bursa Malaysia 
(Saleh et al., 2010). 
Fraser et al. (2006) and Joher et al. (2011) in 
a period before restructuring corporate governance 
find a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and capital structure. The possible rea-
son behind this positive relationship is that insti-
tutional investors were not big and active enough 
in the market to monitor firms and consequently 
they may have used debt financing as an internal 
monitoring mechanism. Therefore, it would be very 
useful to investigate the influence of institutional 
investors on the capital structure of firms after the 
East Asian Crisis, and especially restructuring cor-
porate governance system. Thus, the first objective 
of this study is to highlight the influence of institu-
tional ownership on capital structure after the im-
plementation of new corporate governance system 
in Malaysia. 
In addition, a special and important issue in 
Malaysia is the close link between business and 
politics (Fraser et al., 2006, Wahab and Rahman, 
2009). The Malaysian government plays the role of 
political patron to selected companies. It has a sig-
nificant influence over the capital market through 
direct equity ownership in listed firms, listing re-
strictions, control of the banking sector, and also 
via government-controlled institutional investors. 
Consequently, institutional investors in Malay-
sia are highly dominated by government control or 
management (Fraser et al., 2006). Therefore, we ex-
amine the moderating effect of political connection 
and institutional investors with capital structure. 
It is important to test such relationships because it 
can show the effectiveness of institutional investors’ 
monitoring in politically connected firms.
Another issue is that almost all of the previous 
studies regarding institutional investors and capital 
structure did not classify institutional investors and 
consider them as a homogenous group, while many 
researchers believe that different types of investors 
have different abilities to monitor the managers of 
firms. Therefore, in this study we first examine 
the relationship between total institutional own-
ership (as a homogenous group) and capital struc-
ture. Then, based on their business relations with 
firms, they are classified into pressure-sensitive and 
pressure-insensitive investors. Pressure-insensitive 
investors have no or very little business link with 
firms that they hold shares and consequently they 
are more able to monitor managers. 
The results of study indicate that there is a neg-
ative relationship between institutional ownership 
and capital structure. This implies that restructur-
ing corporate governance mechanism has activated 
institutional investors in the market, they are more 
powerful than before and they can be a good mon-
itoring mechanism in companies. In addition, we 
find that there is a significant relationship only for 
pressure-insensitive institutions. Further, in po-
litically connected firms, institutional investors 
and especially the pressure-insensitive institutions 
which are under more government control, lose 
their monitoring power.  
The following sections describe these issues: 
section 2 explains the role of institutional investors 
in Malaysia based on the new structure of corporate 
governance. In section 3 we argue regarding theo-
retical background about the relationship between 
institutional ownership and the capital structure of 
firms. In section 4 we describe the sample, data and 
methodology. Section 5 presents the descriptive sta-
tistics and discusses the results of regression mod-
els. Finally, in section 6 we conclude the paper.
New Structure of Corporate Governance in 
Malaysia and Role of Institutional Investors
The growth in institutional shareholdings has 
increased considerably in most countries. For ex-
ample, in USA shareholding of institutional inves-
tors in outstanding common stock has increased 
from 6.1% in 1950 to 51% in 2009 (Tonello and 
Rabimov, 2010). In Malaysia, shareholding of in-
stitutional investors is relatively low if compared 
with that in the developed countries. In 2002, the 
proportion of institutional investors of total mar-
ket capitalization was about 13% and Malaysian in-
vestors owned 99% of the investment (Hashim and 
Devi, 2007, Wahab et al., 2008). Not only the in-
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vestment by institutional investors was low in Ma-
laysia, but also they were passive players in the 
market. Thillainathan (1999) mentions that the in-
stitutional investors play just a passive role in cor-
porate governance and they rely on third party re-
search, primarily that by brokerage houses.
Therefore, the Finance Committee on Cor-
porate Governance (FCCG) made two significant 
recommendations in 1999. The first recommenda-
tion was about the founding of the Malaysian Code 
on Corporate Governance (MCCG), which recog-
nizes a structure for the best corporate governance 
practices. According to MCCG, the institutional 
investors have an important role to guarantee good 
corporate governance practices. Institutional inves-
tors are expected to involve themselves in the man-
agement boards of the firms and in the appointment 
of nonexecutive directors. Moreover, MCCG en-
courages institutional investors to keep good rela-
tionships with the firms and other shareholders and 
to have frequent dialogues with them. Particularly, 
FCCG (2000) considers three roles for institutional 
investors: 
(a) Institutional shareholders have a responsi-
bility to make considered use of their votes. 
(b) Institutional investors should encourage di-
rect contact with companies including construc-
tive communication with senior management and 
board members about performance, corporate gov-
ernance, and other matters affecting shareholders’ 
interest. 
(c) When evaluating companies’ governance 
arrangements, particularly those relating to board 
structure and composition, institutional investors 
and their advisers should give due weight to all rel-
evant factors drawn to their attention. 
The second recommendation was about estab-
lishing a Minority Shareholders’ Watchdog Group 
(MAWG). The main objective of this recommenda-
tion is to encourage and support shareholder activ-
ism via institutional investors. In fact, MSWG al-
lows institutional investors to discuss and control 
any governance noncompliance of listed compa-
nies, because their activities can be detrimental and 
harmful to the minority shareholders’ rights and 
interests (Wahab et al., 2007, Wahab et al., 2008). 
With the amendments to the listing require-
ment of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in Jan-
uary 2001, the Malaysian Code was brought into 
full impact (Hashim and Devi, 2007, Mustapha 
and Ahmad, 2011). In same year, MSWG was for-
mally created and five important institutional in-
vestors in Malaysia were included as initial mem-
bers. They included Lembaga Tabung Angkatan 
Tentera (LTAT), Employees Provident Fund (EPF) 
as two pension funds, and Permodalan Nasion-
al Berhad (PNB) as an investment fund, Lembaga 
Urusan Tabung Haji (LUTH) as a pilgrim fund and 
National Social Security Organisation of Malaysia 
(SOCSO) as an insurance company. These inves-
tors plus other large institutional investors in Ma-
laysia such as Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) 
and Khazanah Nasional have tried over the years to 
improve the governance practices in their investee 
by their engagement in management board and us-
ing their votes on key and significant issues at gener-
al meetings (Wahab et al., 2008, Hashim and Devi, 
2007). Collectively, these five institutional investors 
hold about 70% of total institutional shareholdings 
in companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa 
Malaysia (Wahab, et al., 2008). Wahab et al. (2009) 
state that institutional investors have become more 
active players in corporate governance and they be-
gan to give up their traditional passive role.
Hypotheses Development
Institutional investors and capital structure
Based on the capital structure theories, the ex-
istence of agency costs and asymmetric information 
shape the capital structure of firm (Elyasiani et al., 
2010, Li et al., 2009, Michaely and Vincent, 2012). 
Vanacker and Manigart (2010) state that agency 
costs and asymmetric information cause the ex-
istence of a considerably large wedge between the 
cost of internal financing and external financing. 
Institutional investors can change the firm’s capi-
tal structure by mitigating agency costs and asym-
metric information. However, there are two views 
about the role of institutional investors in mitigating 
agency cost and asymmetric information problems.
As regards to agency problem, some scholars 
such as Firth (1995), Harris and Raviv (1990), Jen-
sen (1986), believe that mangers are worried about 
bankruptcy risk because they may lose their jobs, 
and this concern may push them to use less debt. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) state that block-holders 
(including institutional investors) have higher in-
centives to decrease agency costs because they can 
have larger benefits through monitoring. They also 
will have larger voting powers that will enable them 
to take corrective actions when it is necessary (ac-
tive monitoring hypothesis). Brailsford et al. (2002), 
Brickley et al. (1988), Elyasiani et al. (2010), con-
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sistent with the active monitoring hypothesis, find 
that it is more possible that institutional investors 
vote against the harmful changes which will de-
crease shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, they will 
not allow mangers to use less debt than the level 
that is needed for value maximization. 
Conversely, some other researchers believe that 
institutional ownership and debt can be substitut-
ed. Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008), Crutchley et al. 
(1999), Michaely and Vincent (2012), state that in-
stitutional investors have sufficient resources and 
incentives to mitigate the agency conflicts between 
shareholders and managers within a firm. Accord-
ingly, to solve these conflicts, institutional moni-
toring can be considered as a substitute bonding 
mechanism to debt. Consequently, firms with a 
high institutional ownership need less debt in their 
capital structure for mitigating the agency conflicts 
between mangers and shareholders. 
As regard to asymmetric information problem, 
institutional investors are professional groups and 
they make decisions based on scientific and fun-
damental analysis. They are large stockholders, 
and large shareholders can obtain private and bet-
ter quality information from firm’s managers and 
convey them to other owners (Elyasiani et al., 2010, 
Michaely and Vincent, 2012, Bartov et al., 2000). 
In addition, institutional investors, by forcing man-
agers to increase information disclosure, are able to 
mitigate information asymmetry. As a result, the 
adverse selection costs of equity financing will be 
decreased and firms can finance by the issuance 
of new equity instead of debt financing (Elyas-
iani et al., 2010, Bushee and Goodman, 2007, Mi-
chaely and Vincent, 2012). In the signalling theo-
ry, institutional ownership can reduce the need for 
debt to signal equilibriums (Grier and Zychowicz, 
1994, Michaely and Vincent, 2012, Zeckhauser and 
Pound, 1990). According to this view, institutional 
investors are a substitute for debt and consequently, 
there is a negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and debt financing. Conversely, Viswa-
nath (1993) shows that firms have to issue stock op-
timally when asymmetric information problem is 
low to avoid underinvestment in projects with posi-
tive NPV in future. In fact, Viswanath (1993) devel-
ops the intuition of Myers and Majluf (1984) that 
because of the dilution costs of equity financing, 
firms may reject worthwhile projects. However, the 
future equity financing dilutive costs could be de-
creased by reducing the information gap between 
(potential) shareholders and managers. Therefore, 
there is a complementary relationship between le-
verage and institutional ownership if institution-
al investors allow companies to relinquish issuing 
equity today (Michaely and Vincent, 2012). There-
fore, it is acceptable to believe a positive relation-
ship between institutional investors and leverage. 
The previous studies in Malaysia such as Fra-
ser et al. (2006) and Joher et al. (2011) find a posi-
tive relationship between institutional investors and 
debt ratio. However, most of the newest studies in 
the developed countries find a negative relationship. 
In fact, they infer that institutional ownership is a 
substitute mechanism for debt monitoring and con-
sequently, as institutional ownership increases in a 
firm, debt financing decreases. Thus, we expect, 
with the new structure of corporate governance in 
Malaysia, institutional investors have become big-
ger and more efficient and as a result, they could 
be good substitutes for debt monitoring. Therefore, 
we assume a negative relationship between institu-
tional ownership and capital structure in the Ma-
laysian firms. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship 
between institutional ownership and capital struc-
ture in Malaysian firms after restructuring corpo-
rate governance.
Besides, most researchers such as  Almazan et 
al. (2005), Chen et al. (2007), Cornett et al. (2007), 
believe that different investors have different de-
grees of monitoring, preferences, goals, institu-
tions’ diverse clienteles, and constraints. Therefore, 
institutional investors are classified into pressure-
sensitive and pressure-insensitive investors in this 
study. Filatotchev et al. (2005) argue that they often 
have an obligation to support the management’s de-
cisions. Consequently, their governance role tends 
to be more passive in comparison with pressure-in-
sensitive investors. Almazan et al. (2005) and Chen 
et al. (2007) also show that the pressure-insensitive 
institutional investors face lower monitoring costs 
than the pressure-sensitive institutions and they can 
provide more severe monitoring of the corporate 
management. Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Ja-
ra-Bertin et al. (2012) also reveal pressure-insensi-
tive institutional investors are more able to pressure 
management and as a result, enhance shareholders’ 
value and operating performance. Consequently, it 
is expected that pressure-insensitive investors have 
a stronger influence on capital structure than pres-
sure-sensitive institutions. 
Hypothesis 2: Pressure-insensitive institutional 
investors have a stronger negative relationship with 
Social science section
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capital structure than pressure-sensitive institutions. 
Institutional investors and political connection in 
Malaysia
One of the unique features in Malaysia is the 
connection between the government and many cor-
porations. It is a consequence of National Econom-
ic Policy (NEP) in Malaysia that government in-
tervened in Market to increase the Malay equity 
(Wahab et al., 2009). Johnson and Mitton (2003) 
argue that because of diverse ethnic ownership, the 
phenomenon of politically connected companies in 
Malaysia is rather unique in comparison with sim-
ilar companies in other countries. It is document-
ed that firms with close connections to the govern-
ment can have multiple benefits and better access 
to major government contracts. For example, po-
litically connected firms can get easy access to loan 
from government-backed banks and pension funds 
(Chang and Wong, 2004). Fraser et al. (2006) and 
Johnson and Mitton (2003) find that firms with 
political patronage have more debt. Almost all in-
stitutional investors in Malaysia are supported by 
various levels of government Fraser et al. (2006). 
Since most of the institutional investors in Malay-
sia are government controlled, they may be affected 
by politicians. The main institutional investors in 
Malaysia enjoy an investment advisory board that 
chiefly comprise ministers or individuals elect-
ed by the ruling party to supervise and monitor 
the investment decision of the institutional inves-
tors (Wahab and Rahman, 2009). However, po-
litical presence in institutional investors is for im-
proving social obligation (Chang and Wong, 2004), 
which in this case requires institutional monitoring 
of capital structure. In addition, politicians have an 
incentive to impede controlling stockholders and 
managers from entering in behaviours that decrease 
the amount of resources over which politicians have 
discretion (Wahab and Rahman, 2009). However, 
politicians may employ institutional investors to 
follow their own interest and channelling all avail-
able resources to meet their own needs (Wahab and 
Rahman, 2009). Consequently, it is possible for in-
stitutional investors to lose their monitoring power 
in politically connected firms.
Hypothesis 3: The monitoring power of institu-
tional investors decreases in politically connected firm.
Besides, most of the government controlled in-
stitutional investors in Malaysia are classified in the 
pressure-insensitive institutions and most of pres-
sure-sensitive institutional investors are less gov-
ernment controlled. Therefore, it is expected that 
in politically connected firms, pressure-insensitive 
investors are weaker than pressure-sensitive institu-
tions to monitor firms.
Hypothesis 4: Pressure-insensitive institution-
al investors lose more monitoring power than pres-
sure-sensitive institutions in politically connected 
firms.
Methodology
Sample
This paper uses the main market listed compa-
nies of Malaysia as sample for the period between 
2002 and 2011. We exclude financial firms, firms 
with incomplete data and firms with negative as-
sets. To choose our sample, we select one of every 
two firms in the population using a systematic ran-
dom sampling method. This is because the data of 
institutional investors in Malaysia are only acces-
sible via annual reports and there is no database 
for this kind of data. Therefore, collecting data for 
all companies will take a very long time. The final 
sample includes 237 main market firms in differ-
ent sectors. Therefore, we have 2,370 observations 
in our sample. 
Measures 
The dependent variable in this study is capital 
structure. Tong and Ning (2004) state that leverage 
is an ideal proxy for capital structure. Several al-
ternative definitions of leverage have been used in 
the literature. Most studies considered some form 
of a debt ratio. Rajan and Zingales (1995) state that 
leverage could be defined in several ways, depend-
ing on the purpose of the analysis. In this study, we 
measure the leverage by the ratio of total debts to to-
tal assets as the dependent variable because it is the 
most common measure in capital structure studies. 
The variable of interest in this study is institu-
tional investors (IIS). We measure IIS, as the per-
centage of shareholding owned by all institutional 
investors in the company. We include a long series 
of owners as institutional investors such as banks 
and trusts, endowment funds, finance compa-
nies, foundations, government agencies, holding 
companies, investor advisors, insurance compa-
nies, pension funds, private equity firms, broker-
age firms, research firms, and mutual funds. More-
over, following Brickley et al. (1988), Cornett et al. 
(2007), Filatotchev et al. (2005), Kochhar and Da-
vid (1996), Li et al. (2007), to examine the impact 
of different types of institutional investors on our 
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results, this study categorizes institutional investors 
into two groups. One is pressure-sensitive group, 
which usually has current or potential business re-
lationships with their investees through insurance 
services, loan, and mortgages. The other is pres-
sure-insensitive group, which has no or very little 
business relationship with their investees. Pressure-
insensitive institutional investors include private or 
public pension funds, investment companies, in-
dependent investment advisors, brokerage houses, 
stated-owned institutions, mutual funds, and so on. 
In contrast, financial institutions included banks, 
insurance companies are classified as pressure-sen-
sitive institutional investors. Some of institution-
al investors such as Foundations and Endowment 
funds potentially could be classified as pressure-
sensitive and pressure-insensitive. However, to be 
conservative, according to Almazan et al. (2005), 
Chen et al. (2007), Cornett et al. (2007), this study 
classifies these investors as pressure-sensitive inves-
tors. Institutional shareholding data for the period 
2002–2011 are obtained from the annual reports of 
listed companies for each year individually. In ad-
dition, based on the previous capital structure stud-
ies and Malaysian context, some important control 
variables are considered to control some other vari-
ables that influence capital structure. These con-
trol variables include profitability, size of firm, tan-
gibility, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shield, 
market timing, political connection and industry 
type. The list of politically connected firms is de-
rived from Johnson and Mitton (2003) and Wahab 
and Aswadi (2012). Table 1 gives the definition of 
each variable.
Variable Symbol Measurement
Debt ratio DR Total debt to total book assets
Institutional investors IIS Institutional ownership to total shares 
outstanding
Pressure-sensitive institutional 
investors
PSIIS Pressure-sensitive Institutional ownership to 
total shares outstanding
Pressure-insensitive institutional 
investors
PIIIS Pressure-insensitive Institutional ownership to 
total shares outstanding
Profitability PROFIT EBITD to total book assets
Firm size SIZE Natural logarithm of total book assets
Tangibility TANG Total net fixed assets to total book assets
Growth opportunities GO Market-to-book value
Non-debt tax shield NDTS Depreciation expenses to total book assets
Market timing MT The stock price at time t to the price at time t-1
Political connection POL Dummy variable; code 1 is for politically 
connected firm and code 0 is for otherwise
Industry type IND Dummy variables, Property sector is omitted
Table 1. Variables definition
Model Specifi cation
We estimate the multivariate regressions us-
ing panel data methodology in which the debt ra-
tio in each year is a function of various financial 
and ownership variables. Our particular focus is 
the influence of institutional ownership on capital 
structure. However, the relationship between insti-
tutional ownership and capital structure is subject 
to a potential simultaneity bias and consequently, 
endogeneity problem. If institutions are attracted to 
companies with less debt ratio, then a negative rela-
tion between institutional ownership and debt ratio 
might be seen even if that institutional ownership is 
not directly beneficial to debt ratio. In other words, 
it would be hard to distinguish between the hypoth-
esis that institutional investors influence capital 
structure versus the hypothesis that they simply in-
crease holdings in firms with less leverage. There-
fore, we employ a dynamic panel estimation with 
GMM estimator to solve this problem. 
Social science section
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Panel A: Total firms
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum VIF model 
1
VIF model 
2
DR    2370    0.2074 0.1657       0 0.9574 -- --
IIS     2370    0.1667 0.1878       0 0.9203 1.30 --
IIS*POL 2370 0.0200    0.0972 0 0.9203 1.16 --
PSIIS 2370    0.0309 0.0584          0 0.8043 -- 1.14 
PIIIS 2370    0.1358 0.1777          0 0.9102 -- 1.30 
PSIIS*POL 2370    0.0027     0.0211 0 0.4849 -- 1.21 
PIIIS*POL 2370    0.0172    0.0898 0 0.9102 -- 1.26 
PROFIT 2370    0.0801    0.1062    -1.3412 0.9496 1.18 1.18 
SIZE 2370    12.9792    1.4371     5.4196 18.4517 1.25 1.26 
GO 2370    1.0023    1.336      -22.2 30.07 1.12 1.13 
MT 2370    1.1240    0.5947       0.141 6.9486 1.03 1.04 
TANG 2370    0.3941    0.2009          0 0.9549 1.19 1.19 
NDTS 2370    0.0264    0.0213          0 0.1646 1.22 1.23 
Panel B: Political connected firms
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
DR    330 0.2699          0.1954          0.0000 0.6802
IIS     330 0.2963    0.2416      0.0024      0.9203
PSIIS 330 0.0409          0.0715          0.0000 0.4849
PIIIS 330 0.0409          0.0715          0.0000 0.4849
PROFIT 330 0.1173    0.1185    -0.2166      0.6891
SIZE 330 14.1170    1.3381    11.1356    17.6922
GO 330 1.8393    2.7366       -0.12      20.43
MT 330 1.1034    0.4781      0.2766     4.1558
TANG 330 0.4182           0.1996         0.0000 0.9177
NDTS 330 0.0259    0.0221      0.0014      0.1224
Panel C: Non-political connected firms
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
DR    2040 0.2029          0.1625          0.0000 0.9574
IIS     2040 0.1573          0.1807          0.0000 0.8952
PSIIS 2040 0.0302         0.0609          0.0000 0.8043
PIIIS 2040 0.0302         0.0609          0.0000 0.8043
PROFIT 2040 0.0774    0.1047    -1.3412      0.9496
SIZE 2040 12.8968     1.4091     5.4196    18.4517
GO 2040 0.9417    1.1502      -22.2      30.07
MT 2040 1.1254    0.6023       0.141     6.9486
TANG 2040 0.3924    0.2009          0.0000      0.9549
NDTS 2040 0.0264          0.02129     0.0000 0.1646
Notes: This table provides summary information for the dependent and independent variables used in the analysis. 
The mean, standard deviations, maximum, minimum and VIF are presented for all independent variables. 
The dependent variable DR is defined as total debt scaled by book asset. IIS is defined as total institutional 
Table 2. Summary Statistics
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shareholdings to total shares outstanding. IIS*POL is an interaction variables between institutional investors and 
politically connected firms. PSIIS is defined as total pressure-sensitive institutional shareholdings to total shares 
outstanding. PIIIS is defined as total pressure-insensitive institutional shareholdings to total shares outstanding. 
PSIIS*POL is an interaction variable between pressure-sensitive institutional investors and politically connected 
firms. PIIIS*POL is an interaction variable between pressure-insensitive institutional investors and politically 
connected firms. PROFIT is defined as operating income before depreciation scaled by book assets. SIZE is 
defined as natural logarithm of total book assets. GO is defined as market-to-book value. MT is defined as the 
stock price at time t to the price at time t-1. TANG is defined as the net fixed assets scaled by book assets. NDTS 
is defined as depreciation expenses to total book assets.
GMM estimator is the econometric technique 
that permits accounting for the problem of endo-
geneity of variables and error correlation. It is de-
signed to handle endogeneity of regressors and 
fixed effects, while preventing dynamic panel bias. 
It also solves the potential biases caused by the cor-
relation of institutional ownership and debt ratio 
over time (Bajo-Rubio et al., 2010). There are two 
types of GMM estimator: difference GMM and 
system GMM. A drawback of the difference GMM 
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) is that be-
cause of taking  first differences, time-invariant 
variables are eliminated from model. Therefore, 
the estimator could not employ the cross-sectional 
information reflected in the differences between 
industry and politically connected firms. Another 
drawback is that in differences, lagged levels are 
often weak instruments for the equation, especial-
ly when we have a panel with small number of time 
periods and highly persistent data. This could lead 
to great finite-sample biases and weak precision in 
the estimators. To mitigate these problems relat-
ed with the difference GMM estimator, a new es-
timator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998), namely the system 
GMM is used. The GMM estimator which com-
bines the moment conditions for the differenced 
model with those for the levels model (Arellano 
and Bover, 1995, Blundell and Bond, 1998). Two 
specification tests are required to be passed for 
the consistency of the GMM estimator, the Sar-
gan test of over-identifying restrictions and a serial 
correlation test in the disturbances (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). The present paper employs the two-
step estimator of the system GMM. In addition, 
since Sargan test is not robust to heterokedasticity 
(Bajo-Rubio et al., 2010), the system GMM with 
robust standard error is used for conclusion. But, 
for comparison purpose we report both robust and 
non-robust results. In all cases Arellando-Bond 
test shows that there is no serial correlation in the 
first differenced disturbances.
Results and Discussion
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the de-
pendent and independent variables used in this study.
As shown in the Table 2, the average percentage 
of institutional stockholdings is 16.67% and the av-
erage of debt ratio was 20.7%. There is an increase 
by almost 4% in institutional ownership in propor-
tion to 2002 reported by Wahab et al. (2008) and a 
decrease by almost 9% in debt ratio in comparison 
with the crisis period (1997-1998). Pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors hold, on average, 3% of the to-
tal shares, while pressure-insensitive institutional in-
vestors own, on average, 13.5% of the total shares. 
In addition, the maximum amount of institutional 
ownership is in politically connected firms (92.03%) 
and especially by pressure-insensitive institutions, 
and this is in line with our explanation that most 
of pressure-insensitive institutions are government 
linked. Moreover, in line with the previous findings 
in Malaysia, results of Table 2 in Panel B and pan-
el C show that political connected firms have high-
er debt ratio in comparison with non-political con-
nected companies (0.2699 VS 0.2029).  The Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF) analysis also indicates that 
there is not multicolinearity problem in our regres-
sion models.
Table 3 shows the regression results of the model 
(1). The Sargan and Arellano-Bond test shows that 
there is no problem about over-identifying restric-
tions and second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced error term, but to be conservative we re-
port results with robust standard errors in column 3. 
In column 1 we regress only control variables, but in 
column 2 and 3 we insert our main independent vari-
ables, namely institutional investors and its interac-
tion with politically connected firms. 
The results of system GMM estimator, in col-
umn 3, confirm that higher institutional investment 
is in fact related to low leverage. This is consistent 
with the notion that institutional ownership enhanc-
es the monitoring of corporate managers. The result 
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is significant at 5% level and supports the substitu-
tion role of institutional investors for debt monitor-
ing. This is in contrast with the previous studies in 
Malaysia such as Fraser et al. (2006) and Joher et 
al. (2011). This could be because these aforemen-
tioned studies covered the period before the restruc-
ture of corporate governance and institutional inves-
tors were not big and active enough to influence the 
market. Therefore, it can be concluded that with the 
new mechanism of corporate governance in Malay-
sia, institutional investors are more active than before 
in the market and they could be a good substitute for 
internal monitoring mechanism such as debt financ-
ing. The negative relationship between institutional 
investors and debt ratio is consistent with both agen-
cy and asymmetric theories. This result is also in line 
with the previous studies in other countries such as 
Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008) in Jordan; Bathala et al. 
(1994), Grier and Zychowicz (1994), Michaely and 
Vincent (2012), Samuel (1996) in USA; and Short 
et al. (2002) in UK. The result also differs from those 
of Brailsford et al. (2002), Firth (1995), Friend and 
Lang (1988), Huang and Song (2006), Pound (1988), 
that consistent with active monitoring hypothesis, 
find positive relationship between institutional inves-
tors and debt ratio.
Dependent variable: total debt ratio
Independent variables (1) (2)  (3)
IIS ---
-0.0889**   
(0.0344)    
-0.0889**
   (0.0424)
IIS*POL ---
0.1694
   (0.1416)     
0.1694
    (0.1846)
PROFIT 
-0.1744***   
(0.0377)    
-0.1812***   
(0.0377)    
-0.1812***   
(0.0603)
SIZE 
0.05546***   
(0.0142)     
0.0578***   
(0.0140)     
0.0578***
    (0.0217)
GO 
0.0057***    
(0.0019)     
0.0054***   
(0.0018)     
0.0054**   
(0.0022)
MT 
-0.0084***   
(0.0028)    
-0.0083***   
(0.0029)    
-0.0083**   
(0.0038)
TANG 
0.1919***   
(0.0302)     
0.1877***   
(0.0304)     
0.1877***   
(0.0412)
NDTS 
-1.4953***   
(0.3414)    
-1.4534***   
(0.3405)    
-1.4534***
   (0.4367)
POL 
0.0396   
(0.6239)     
0.8906
(1.1616)     
0.8906   
(2.9842)
(Sector effects)
Construction 
-0.6909   
(0.7823)    
-1.7623
   (1.4665)    
-1.7623
   (3.3900)
Consumer 
-0.7768   
(1.0800)    
-2.0021   
(1.9428)    
-2.0021   
(4.9400)
IND-PROD
-0.5443   
(0.8610)    
-1.5253
(1.6022)    
-1.5253
   (3.2898)
Plantation
-0.0262    
(0.8051)    
0.5572
   (1.5022)     
0.5572   
(1.9909)
Technology 
-0.1535   
(0.5664)    
-0.7535   
(1.0322)    
-0.7535   
(1.9683)
Trading/Services
-0.4669    
(0.8069)    
-1.4821
(1.4833)    
-1.4821
   (3.0936)
Observation 2133 2133 2133
Sargan test
36.3474
0.4525
37.1318
0.4166
--
--
AR (1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AR (2) 0.6331 0.7036    0.7040
Table 3. Total institutional investors and capital structure
Notes: Using two-step system GMM, this table reports estimates from panel regressions of leverage on institutional 
investors. The dependent variable DR is defined as total debt scaled by book asset. IIS is defined as total institutional 
shareholdings to total shares outstanding. IIS*POL is an interaction variables between institutional investors and 
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politically connected firms. PROFIT is defined as operating income before depreciation scaled by book assets. 
SIZE is defined as natural logarithm of total book assets. GO is defined as market-to-book value. MT is defined 
as the stock price at time t to the price at time t-1. TANG is defined as the net fixed assets scaled by book assets. 
NDTS is defined as depreciation expenses to total book assets. POL is a dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 if firm is politically connected. Sector effects = sector dummy (Construction, Consumer, IND-PROD, 
Plantation, technology and trading/services, with properties being the omitted sector). ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests of first- and second-
order serial correlation. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are robust in column 3.
                                        Dependent variable: total debt ratio
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PSIIS ---
-0.0275   
(0.0673)
---
-0.0320   
(0.0672)    
-0.0320  
(0 .0999)
PIIIS --- ---
-0.0972*** 
(0.0354)
-0.0995***   
(0.0357)    
-0.0995**   
(0.0432)
PSIIS*POL ---
-0.0497   
(0.1466)
---
-0.0207
   (0.1376)    
-0.0207  
 (0.1633)
PIIIS*POL --- ---
0 . 5 1 7 3 * * * 
(0.1948)
0 . 5 1 0 5 1 * * 
(0.1994)     
0.5105   
(0.3963)
PROFIT 
-0.1744***
   (0.0377)    
-0.1735***   
(0.0377)
-0.1744***   
(0.0382)
-0.1738***
   (0.0381)    
-0.1738*** 
(0.0604)
SIZE 
0.05546***   
(0.0142)     
0.0555***   
(0.0138)
0.0582***   
(0.0141)
0.0582***   
(0.0137)     
0.0582***   
(0.0220)
GO 
0.0057***
    (0.0019)     
0.0057***    
(0.0019)
0.0055***   
(0.0018)
0.0055***   
(0.0017)     
0.0055***   
(0.0020)
MT 
-0.0084***   
(0.0028)    
-0.0085***   
(0.0028)
-0.0088*** 
(0.0029)
- 0 . 0 0 8 9 * * * 
(0.0029)    
-0.0089**   
(0.0039)
TANG
0.1919***
   (0.0302)     
0.1912 ***
   (0.0302)
0.1927***   
(0.0306)
0.1916***   
(0.0306)     
0.19161***   
(0.0425)
NDTS 
-1.4953***   
(0.3414)    
-1.4872***    
(0.3380)
-1.4609*** 
(0.3396)
-1.4537***
   (0.3354)    
-1.4537***   
(0.4447)
POL 
0.0396   
(0.6239)     
0.0610
   (0.6282)
1.2023   
(1.6403)
1.2614
   (1.6631)     
1.2614  
 (3.9665)
(Sector effects)
Construction 
-0.6909   
(0.7823)    
-0.7266   
(0.7838)
-2.0990
   (2.1459)
-2.1821   
(2.1721)    
-2.1821   
(4.5093)
Consumer 
-0.7768   
(1.0800)    
-0.7955   
(1.0844)
-2.1776   
(2.8123)
-2.2544   
(2.8464)    
-2.2544   
(6.1325)
IND-PROD
-0.5443   
(0.8610)    
-0.5793   
(0.8640)
-1.8871   
(2.3493)
-1.9686   
(2.3736)    
-1.9686   
(4.2127)
Plantation
-0.0262    
(0.8051)    
-0.0181   
(0.8115)
0.9665   
(2.1901)
0.9827
   (2.2199)     
0.9827  
 (2.9257)
Technology 
-0.1535   
(0.5664)    
-0.1840   
(0.5711)
-1.0386
   (1.5298)
-1.1012   
(1.5442)    
-1.1012   
(2.6278)
Trading/Services
-0.4669    
(0.8069)    
-0.5073   
(0.8121)
-1.9902   
(2.1711)
-2.0649   
(2.1931)    
-2.0649   
(4.0461)
Observation 2133 2133 2133 2133 2133
Sargan test
36.3474
0.4525
36.1025
0.4639
38.2851
0.3661
38.0478
0.3763
---
---
AR (1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AR (2) 0.6331 0.6514 0.7033 0.7221 0.7225
Table 4. Different types of institutional investors and capital structure
Notes: Using two-step system GMM, this table reports estimates from panel regressions of leverage on different 
types of institutional investors. The dependent variable DR is defined as total debt scaled by book asset. PSIIS is 
defined as total pressure-sensitive institutional shareholdings to total shares outstanding. PIIIS is defined as total 
pressure-insensitive institutional shareholdings to total shares outstanding. PSIIS*POL is an interaction variable 
between pressure-sensitive institutional investors and politically connected firms. PIIIS*POL is an interaction 
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The coefficient on the interaction of institu-
tional investors and politically connected firms is 
positive (0.1694) and statistically insignificant. This 
positive relation is in line with this view that poli-
ticians may employ institutional investors to follow 
their own interests and channelling all available re-
sources to serve their own needs. This finding shows 
that the nature of firm being politically connected 
decreases the monitoring effect of institutional in-
vestors on capital structure. This might also indi-
cate that in politically connected companies, insti-
tutional investors have a personal agenda and are 
more eager to fulfil political objectives rather than 
social objectives. Wahab and Rahman (2009) also 
find that politically connected firms with high lev-
el of institutional ownership are positively and sig-
nificantly related to director remuneration, and this 
means that the effectiveness of institutional moni-
toring is mitigated in politically connected firms. 
In Table 4, we divide the institutional share-
holdings into pressure-sensitive and pressure-in-
sensitive investors. In column 1 we put only control 
variables. In column 2 we add the pressure-sensi-
tive institutions and their interaction with politi-
cally connected firms. In column 3 we insert the 
pressure-insensitive institutions and their interac-
tion with politically connected firms. In column 4 
the results of regression model 2 with all variables 
are presented and the results of column 5 are with 
robust standard errors. 
The results of System GMM estimator, consis-
tent with our hypothesis, show that although pres-
sure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive investors 
have negative coefficients, but there is a significant 
relationship only for pressure-insensitive investors. 
In fact, this result, in line with the literature, shows 
that institutions with no or very little business re-
lations with their investees are more able to moni-
tor managers and conduct decision making (Alma-
zan et al., 2005, Chen et al., 2007, Cornett et al., 
2007, Jara-Bertin et al., 2012). In addition, as we 
expected, in politically connected firms pressure-
insensitive institutional investors are weaker than 
pressure-sensitive investors. The coefficient on 
the pressure-insensitive institutions in total firms 
changes from -0.0995 to 0.5105 in politically con-
nected firms and in non-robust results (column 4), 
the coefficient even become positive and signifi-
cant. However, the coefficient on pressure-sensi-
tive institutions is still negative and insignificant al-
though it decreases from -0.0320 in total firms to 
-0.0207 in politically connected firms. This is be-
cause most governmental institutional investors are 
classified in the pressure-insensitive group, thus in 
politically connected firms, they could not moni-
tor managers efficiently and follow managers’ deci-
sions. Wahab and Rahman (2009) also find that in 
politically connected firm, there is a positive rela-
tionship between pressure-insensitive institutional 
investors with director and executive director remu-
neration. They state that pressure-insensitive insti-
tutions do monitor the companies but the fact that 
a company is politically connected reduces their 
monitoring power.
Sensitivity checks
Our regression analysis confirms a negative 
link between institutional investors and capital 
structure. However, in Table 5, we run three sen-
sitivity tests to examine if the results of the main 
models still hold or not. First, following  Chen et 
al. (2007) we measure institutional ownership as 
the shareholding of top 5 institutional investors to 
check the concentration effect of them on leverage. 
Second, following Crutchley et al. (1999), Michae-
ly and Vincent (2012) we insert managerial owner-
ship to test whether institutional holdings have an 
effect on debt ratio above and beyond that of insid-
er shareholdings. Finally,  according to Frank and 
Goyal (2009) we change the dependent variable and 
use long-term debt ratio instead of total debt ratio.
The results of Table 5 in columns 1 show that 
after substituting top 5 institutional investors’ share-
holding for total institutional ownership, still there 
is significant relationship with debt ratio at 5% lev-
variable between pressure-insensitive institutional investors and politically connected firms. PROFIT is defined 
as operating income before depreciation scaled by book assets. SIZE is defined as natural logarithm of total book 
assets. GO is defined as market-to-book value. MT is defined as the stock price at time t to the price at time t-1. 
TANG is defined as the net fixed assets scaled by book assets. NDTS is defined as depreciation expenses to total 
book assets. POL is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if firm is politically connected. Sector effects 
= sector dummy (Construction, Consumer, IND-PROD, Plantation, technology and trading/services, with 
properties being the omitted sector). ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests of first- and second-order serial correlation. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) 
are robust in column 5.
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el. However, the magnitude of coefficient increase 
from -0.088 for total institutional ownership to 
-0.094 for top 5 institutional investors’ sharehold-
ing. It is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
that more concentrated institutional investors are 
more effective at decreasing agency and asymmet-
ric information problems. In addition, in line with 
the previous results, top 5 institutional investors also 
lose their monitoring power in politically connected 
firms. The interaction variable of top 5 institutional 
investors and politically connected firms has an in-
significant and negative relationship with debt ratio.
Total debt ratio Long-term debt ratio
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
5IIS
-0.0945**   
(0.0351)    
--- ---
5IIS*pol
-0.0011   
(0.0018)    
--- ---
IIS --- 
-0.0885**     
(0.0425)
-0.0506*   
(0.0288)    
---
IIS*Pol ---
0.1694   
(0.1840)
---
0.1223   
(0.0777)     
---
PSIIS --- ---
-0.0312   
(0.0994)
---
0.0456   
(0.0469)     
PIIIS --- ---
- 0 . 0 9 9 2 * * 
(0.0434)
---
-0.0728**   
(0.0328)    
PSIIS*POL --- ---
-0.0215   
(0.1633)
---
-0.0950   
(0.1411)    
PIIIS*POL --- ---
0.5135   
(0.3995)
---
0.2478***   
(0.0810)     
PROFIT
-0.1839***
    (0.0397)    
-0.1807***   
(0.0602)
-0.1731***   
(0.0603)
-0.0469***
   (0.0145)    
-0.0462***
    (0.0143)    
SIZE 
0.0545***   
(0.0141)     
0.0572***   
(0.0211)
0.0573***
   (0.0214)
0.0347***   
(0.0128)     
0.0349***   
(0.0126)     
GO 
0.0056***
(0.0018)   
0.0054**  
 (0.0021)
0.0054 ***  
(0.0020)
0.0045***
   (0.0014)     
0.0046***   
(0.0014)     
MT 
-0.0085***   
(0.0028)    
- 0 . 0 0 8 3 * * 
(0.0038)
-0.0088**   
(0.00393)
-0.0041   
(0.0031)    
-0.0042   
(0.0030)    
TANG 
0.1895*** 
(0.0302)     
0.1901***   
(0.0401)
0.1947***
   (0.0414)
0.1258***   
(0.0283)     
0.1319***    
(0.0287)     
NDTS 
-1.4769***   
(0.3409)    
-1.4448***   
(0.4422)
-1.4420***
   (0.4501)
-0.2852   
(0.2856)    
-0.2960   
(0.2777)    
POL 
0.4205   
(0.7340)     
0.8554   
(2.9425)
1.1988   
(3.8940)
0.0625  
(0.1355)    
0.0646    
(0.1221)    
MO ---
0.01483   
(0.0738)
0.0202   
(0.0752)
--- ---
(Sector effects)
Construction 
-1.150   
(0.8898)    
-1.7284   
(3.3665)
-2.1299   
(4.4821)
-0.0650   
(0.4124)    
0.1143   
(0.3787)     
Consumer 
-1.3564   
(1.2361)    
-1.9588   
(4.9162)
-2.1839   
(6.1013)
0.0999   
(0.2216)     
0.1494   
(0.2073)     
IND-PROD
-0.8896   
(0.9492)    
-1.4864   
(3.2713)
-1.9086     
(4.1939)
0.1321   
(0.2036)     
0.1858   
(0.1996)     
Plantation
0.1240   
(0.8386)     
0.5483   
(1.9633)
0.9652   
(2.8944)
0.1737   
(0.3625)     
0.2561   
(0.3400)     
Technology 
-0.3404   
(0.6021)    
-0.7323  
 (1.9788)
-1.0714  
 (2.6532)
0.1188   
(0.2974)     
0.2129  
(0.2875)     
Trading/Services
-0.7815   
(0.8786)    
-1.4376   
(3.0588)
-1.9941   
(3.9960)
0.1021   
(0.2117)     
0.1597    
(0.2046)     
Observation 2133 2133 2133 2133 2133
Sargan test
36.1287
0.4626
37.2146
0.4129
38.2152
0.3691
37.4177
0.4039
36.7965
0.4318
AR (1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AR (2) 0.6686 0.7009 0.7187 0.2171 0.2422
Table 5. Sensitivity checks about the relationship between institutional investors and capital structure
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Notes: Using two-step system GMM, this table reports the results of some sensitivity tests about the relationship 
between institutional investors and capital structure. The dependent variable DR is defined as total debt to total 
book asset in columns 1-3 and long-term debt to total book assets in columns 4 and 5. 5IIS is defined as total 
shareholding by top 5 institutional investors. 5IIS*POL is an interaction variables between top 5 institutional 
investors and politically connected firms. IIS is defined as total institutional holdings to total shares outstanding. 
IIS*POL is an interaction variables between institutional investors and politically connected firms. PSIIS is 
defined as total pressure-sensitive institutional shareholdings to total shares outstanding. PIIIS is defined as total 
pressure-insensitive institutional shareholdings to total shares outstanding. PSIIS*POL is an interaction variable 
between pressure-sensitive institutional investors and politically connected firms. PIIIS*POL is an interaction 
variable between pressure-insensitive institutional investors and politically connected firms. PROFIT is defined 
as operating income before depreciation scaled by book assets. SIZE is defined as natural logarithm of total book 
assets. GO is defined as market-to-book value. MT is defined as the stock price at time t to the price at time t-1. 
TANG is defined as the net fixed assets scaled by book assets. NDTS is defined as depreciation expenses to total 
book assets. POL is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if firm is politically connected. MO is defined 
as direct managerial shareholding to total shares outstanding. Sector effects = sector dummy (Construction, 
Consumer, IND-PROD, Plantation, technology and trading/services, with properties being the omitted sector). 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) 
are tests of first- and second-order serial correlation. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are robust in all 
results.
The results of Table 5 in columns 2 and 3 also 
indicate that after controlling for managerial own-
ership’s effect, there is still a significant and negative 
relationship for institutional ownership at 5% lev-
el. Bathala et al. (1994) and Crutchley et al. (1999) 
state that the use of debt and managerial ownership 
are inversely related to institutional ownership in 
the firm. In other word, they argue that institution-
al ownership substitute for both managerial owner-
ship and leverage in controlling agency costs. Chen 
and Steiner (2005) also find substitution effects be-
tween institutional ownership and managerial own-
ership. In fact, managerial ownership influenc-
es capital structure via an interaction with agency 
costs, a channel through that institutional owner-
ship potentially affects capital structure. However, 
we do not find such substitute relationship between 
managerial ownership and institutional sharehold-
ings in this study. In general, we find the influence 
of institutional ownership on debt ratio to be robust 
even after controlling for managerial holdings. 
In addition, according to Table 5 (columns 4 
and 5) when long-term debt ratio is used instead of 
total debt ratio, the negative relationship between 
total institutional investors and debt ratio still ex-
ists but it is significant at 10% level while it was sig-
nificant at 5% level (Table 3). It is because of het-
erogeneity of institutional investors. Table 5 shows 
that there is a positive relation for pressure-sensitive 
and negative relation for pressure-insensitive insti-
tutions. Thus, the effect of pressure-sensitive in-
stitutions reduces the effect of pressure-insensitive 
investors. The positive relationship for pressure-
sensitive institutions can be reasonable, although 
it is still insignificant, because bank and insurance 
companies are classified in this category and they 
are conservative investors (Baert and Vander Ven-
net, 2009). Since short-term financing increase the 
default risk, they push firms to use long-term debt 
instead of short-term financing. On the other side, 
pressure-insensitive institutions still have negative 
and significant relationship at 5% level, although it 
was significant at 1% level when total debt ratio is 
used as dependent variables (Table 4). The interac-
tion of institutional investors and politically con-
nected firms still has a positive and insignificant 
relationship. The interaction of pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors and politically connected 
firms still has a negative and insignificant associa-
tion and the interaction variable for pressure-insen-
sitive institutions again has positive and insignifi-
cant relationship.
Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the influence of in-
stitutional ownership on capital structure after the 
implementation of new corporate governance struc-
ture in Malaysia in 2001. Using a panel data from 
237 the main market Malaysian firms over the peri-
od of 2002-2011, the results show that there is a sig-
nificant and negative relationship between institu-
tional ownership and debt ratio. This is in contrast 
with the previous studies conducted in Malaysia 
that covered the period before restructuring cor-
porate governance. This finding indicates that with 
the new structure of corporate governance in Ma-
laysia, institutional investors have become more ac-
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tive in the market and they play a more effective role 
in monitoring firms. In addition, our research also 
provides evidence of selectivity in terms of various 
types of institutional investors. The literature on 
institutional investors shows that they are hetero-
geneous and they have different abilities to monitor 
managers. Therefore, we divide institutional inves-
tors into pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive 
institutions. Our results reveal that there is a nega-
tive and significant association only for pressure-
insensitive institutions. This supports the literature 
that pressure-insensitive investors due to the lack of 
business relation with their investees, are more able 
to monitor managers than pressure-sensitive inves-
tors. Moreover, since the previous studies such as 
Fraser et al. (2006), Wahab and Rahman (2009) 
state that most institutional investors in Malaysia 
are government controlled, we examine the effect 
of institutional investors on capital structure in po-
litically connected firms by adding an interaction 
variable. The results show that institutional inves-
tors lose their monitoring power in politically con-
nected firms and it is more severe for the pressure-
insensitive institutions.
Generally, the findings of this study suggests 
that the public resources spent on improving cor-
porate governance, particularly regarding the in-
stitutional investors, were successful and mar-
ket regulators should continue this improvement 
to enhance the power of institutional investors for 
monitoring. Further, it may be necessary for mar-
ket regulators to address the issue of interest con-
flict which impede institutional investors from 
exercising their effects and stops them from fully 
exercising their fiduciary responsibilities. In addi-
tion, since the results show that institutions with 
less or no business relationship with their invest-
ees have stronger monitoring power, policy mak-
ers should pay more attention to this kind of insti-
tutional investors and encourage the investment by 
pressure-insensitive institutions to improve corpo-
rate governance in the market. Also, because insti-
tutional investors, due to government controlling, 
lose their monitoring power in politically con-
nected firms, in order to better monitoring, policy 
makers should encourage investment by more in-
dependent institutions in the market and especial-
ly in firms with weaker corporate governance like 
politically connected firms. In addition, the results 
of this study can give institutional investors some 
incentives to exercise their voice to affect decision 
making in firms.  
References
Al-Najjar, B. & Taylor, P. (2008). The relationship 
between capital structure and ownership struc-
ture: New evidence from Jordanian panel data. 
Managerial Finance, 34, 919-933.
Alba, P., Claessens, S. & Djankov, S. (1998). Thai-
land’s corporate financing and governance 
structures, World Bank Publications.
Almazan, A., Hartzell, J. C. & Starks, L. T. (2005). 
Active institutional shareholders and costs of 
monitoring: Evidence from executive compen-
sation. Financial Management, 34,  5-34.
Arellano, M. & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of spec-
ification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence 
and an application to employment equations. 
The Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277-297.
Arellano, M. & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at 
the instrumental variable estimation of error-
components models. Journal of econometrics, 
68,  29-51.
Baert, L. & Vander Vennet, R. (2009). Bank own-
ership, firm value and firm capital structure in 
Europe. the Socio-economic Sciences and Hu-
manities. European Commission: DIW Berlin, 
German Institute for Economic Research.
Bajo-Rubio, O., Díaz-Mora, C. & Díaz-Roldán, 
C. (2010). Foreign direct investment and re-
gional growth: an analysis of the Spanish case. 
Regional Studies, 44, 373-382.
Bartov, E., Radhakrishnan, S. & Krinsky, I. (2000). 
Investor sophistication and patterns in stock re-
turns after earnings announcements. Account-
ing Review, 75, 43-63.
Bathala, C. T., Moon, K. P. & Rao, R. P. (1994). 
Managerial ownership, debt policy, and the im-
pact of institutional holdings: An agency per-
spective. Financial Management, 23, 38-50.
Blundell, R. & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions 
and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data 
models. Journal of econometrics, 87, 115-143.
Brailsford, T. J., Oliver, B. R. & Pua, S. L. H. 
(2002). On the relation between ownership 
structure and capital structure. Accounting & 
Finance, 42, 1-26.
Brickley, J. A., Lease, R. C. & Smith Jr, C. W. 
(1988). Ownership structure and voting on an-
titakeover amendments. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 20, 267-291.
Bushee, B. J. & Goodman, T. H. (2007). Which in-
stitutional investors trade based on private in-
formation about earnings and returns? Journal 
Social science section
312 Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com 
of Accounting Research, 45, 289-321.
Chang, E. C. & Wong, S. M. L. (2004). Politi-
cal control and performance in China’s listed 
firms. Journal of Comparative Economics, 32, 
617-636.
Chang, S. J. (2006). Business groups in East Asia: 
Post-crisis restructuring and new growth. Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management, 23, 407-417.
Chen, C. R. & Steiner, T. L. (2005). Managerial 
ownership and agency conflicts: A nonlinear 
simultaneous equation analysis of managerial 
ownership, risk taking, debt policy, and divi-
dend policy. Financial Review, 34, 119-136.
Chen, X., Harford, J. & Li, K. (2007). Monitoring: 
Which institutions matter? Journal of Finan-
cial Economics, 86, 279-305.
Claessens, S. & Fan, J. P. H. (2002). Corporate 
governance in Asia: A survey. International 
Review of Finance, 3, 71-103.
Cornett, M. M., Marcus, A. J., Saunders, A. & 
Tehranian, H. (2007). The impact of institu-
tional ownership on corporate operating per-
formance. Journal of Banking & Finance, 31, 
1771-1794.
Crutchley, C. E., Jensen, M. R. H., Jahera Jr, J. S. 
& Raymond, J. E. (1999). Agency problems and 
the simultaneity of financial decision making: 
The role of institutional ownership. Interna-
tional Review of Financial Analysis, 8, 177-
197.
Driffield, N., Mahambare, V. & Pal, S. (2007). 
How does ownership structure affect capital 
structure and firm value? Recent evidence from 
East Asia1. Economics of Transition, 15, 535-
573.
Elyasiani, E., Jia, J. & Mao, C. X. (2010). Institu-
tional ownership stability and the cost of debt. 
Journal of Financial Markets, 13, 475-500.
FCCG (2000). Malaysian Code on Corporate Gov-
ernance. In: FINANCE, M. O. (ed.) 1 ed. Min-
istry of finance: Malaysia.
Ferreira, M. A. & Matos, P. (2008). The colors of 
investors’ money: The role of institutional in-
vestors around the world. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 88, 499-533.
Filatotchev, I., Lien, Y. C. & Piesse, J. (2005). Cor-
porate governance and performance in publicly 
listed, family-controlled firms: Evidence from 
Taiwan. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 
22, 257-283.
Firth, M. (1995). The impact of institutional stock-
holders and managerial interests on the capital 
structure of firms. Managerial and Decision 
Economics, 16, 167-175.
Frank, M. Z. & Goyal, V. K. (2009). Capital struc-
ture decisions: which factors are reliably impor-
tant? Financial Management, 38, 1-37.
Fraser, D. R., Zhang, H. & Derashid, C. (2006). 
Capital structure and political patronage: The 
case of Malaysia. Journal of Banking & Fi-
nance, 30, 1291-1308.
Friend, I. & Lang, L. H. P. (1988). An empirical 
test of the impact of managerial self-interest on 
corporate capital structure. Journal of finance, 
43, 271-281.
Grier, P. & Zychowicz, E. J. (1994). Institutional 
investors, corporate discipline, and the role of 
debt. Journal of Economics and Business, 46, 
1-11.
Harris, M. & Raviv, A. (1990). Capital structure 
and the informational role of debt. Journal of 
finance, 45, 321-349.
Hashim, H. A. & Devi, S. S. (2007). Corporate 
governance, ownership structure and earnings 
quality: Malaysian evidence. Research in Ac-
counting and Emerging Economies, 8, 97-123.
Huang, S. G. & Song, F. M. (2006). The determi-
nants of capital structure: Evidence from Chi-
na. China Economic  Review, 17, 14-36.
Iskander, M. & Chamlou, N. (2000). Corporate 
governance: A Framework for Implementa-
tion, World Bank, Global Corporte Gover-
nance Forum, Secretariat.
Jara-Bertin, M., López-Iturriaga, F. J. & López-
de-Foronda, Ó. (2012). Does the influence of 
institutional investors depend on the institu-
tional framework? An international analysis. 
Applied Economics, 44, 265-278.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash 
flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The 
American Economic Review, 76, 323-329.
Joher, H., Ali, M. & Nazrul, M. (2011). The impact 
of ownership structure on corporate debt poli-
cy: two stage least square simultaneous model 
approach for post crisis period: evidence from 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. Internation-
al Business & Economics Research Journal 
(IBER), 5, 51-64.
Johnson, S. & Mitton, T. (2003). Cronyism and 
capital controls: evidence from Malaysia. Jour-
nal of Financial Economics, 67, 351-382.
Kochhar, R. & David, P. (1996). Institutional in-
vestors and firm innovation: A test of compet-
ing hypotheses. Strategic Management Jour-
Social science section
313 Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com 
nal, 17, 73-84.
Li, D., Moshirian, F., Pham, P. K. & Zein, J. 
(2007). When financial institutions are large 
shareholders: The role of macro corporate gov-
ernance environments. The Journal of Fi-
nance, 61, 2975-3007.
Li, K., Yue, H. & Zhao, L. (2009). Ownership, in-
stitutions, and capital structure: Evidence from 
China. Journal of comparative economics, 37, 
471-490.
Michaely, R. & Vincent, C. (2012). Do Institu-
tional Investors Influence Capital Struc-
ture Decisions? Available: http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1941902 [Accessed 12 November 2012].
Mustapha, M. & Ahmad, A. C. (2011). Agency the-
ory and managerial ownership: evidence from 
Malaysia. Managerial Auditing Journal, 26, 
419-436.
Myers, S. C. & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate fi-
nancing and investment decisions when firms 
have information that investors do not have. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187-221.
Nadaraja, p., Zulkafli, A. H. & Masron, T. A. (2011). 
Family Ownership, Firm’s Financial Charac-
teristics and Capital Structure: Evidence from 
Public Listed Companies in Malaysia. Econo-
mia. Seria Management, 14, 141-156.
Pound, J. (1988). Proxy contests and the efficiency 
of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 20, 237-265.
Saleh, M., Zulkifli, N. & Muhamad, R. (2010). 
Corporate social responsibility disclosure and 
its relation on institutional ownership: Evi-
dence from public listed companies in Malay-
sia. Managerial Auditing Journal, 25, 591-613.
Samuel, C. (1996). Stock Market and Invest-
ment: Governance Role of the Market. 
Available:worldbank.org/content/workingpa-
per/10.1596/1813-9450-1578 [Accessed 20 
March 2012].
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large share-
holders and corporate control. The Journal of 
Political Economy, 94, 461-488.
Short, H., Keasey, K. & Duxbury, D. (2002). Capi-
tal structure, management ownership and large 
external shareholders: a UK analysis. Interna-
tional Journal of the Economics of Business, 
9, 375-399.
Suto, M. (2003). Capital Structure and Investment 
Behaviour of Malaysian Firms in the 1990s: a 
study of corporate governance before the crisis. 
Corporate Governance: An International Re-
view, 11, 25-39.
Thillainathan, R. (1999). Corporate Governance 
& Restructuring in Malaysia- A review of mar-
kets, mechanisms, agents and the legal infra-
structure. Paper prepared for the joint World 
Bank and OECD Survey of Corporate Gover-
nance [Online]. Available: http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/7/24/1931380.pdf [Accessed 25 
March 2012].
Tonello, M. & Rabimov, S. R. (2010). The 2010 In-
stitutional Investment Report: Trends in As-
set Allocation and Portfolio Composition. The 
Conference Board Research Report, No. R-
1468-10-RR
Tong, S. & Ning, Y. (2004). Does capital structure 
affect institutional investor choices? The Jour-
nal of Investing, 13, 53-66.
Vanacker, T. & Manigart, S. (2010). Pecking or-
der and debt capacity considerations for high-
growth companies seeking financing. Small 
Business Economics, 35, 53-69.
Viswanath, P. (1993). Strategic considerations, the 
pecking order hypothesis, and market reactions 
to equity financing. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 28, 213-234.
Wahab, A. & Aswadi, E. (2012). Institutional In-
vestors and Analyst Coverage in Malaysia. 
Available: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025622 
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2025622 [Ac-
cessed 25 November 2012].
Wahab, E. A. A., How, J. & Verhoeven, P. (2007). 
Institutional investors, corporate governance 
and firm performance in Malaysia. Proceed-
ings of the Second Journal of Contemporary 
Accounting and Economics Symposium, 5-6 
January, Penang, Malaysia.
Wahab, E. A. A., How, J. & Verhoeven, P. (2008). 
Corporate governance and institutional inves-
tors: Evidence from Malaysia. Asian Academy 
of Management Journal of Accounting and Fi-
nance, 4, 67-90.
Wahab, E. A. A. & Rahman, R. A. (2009). Institution-
al investors and director remuneration: do politi-
cal connections matter? Corporate Governance 
and Firm Performance. Advances in Financial 
Economics: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Wahab, E. A. A., Zain, M. M., James, K. & Haron, 
H. (2009). Institutional investors, political con-
nection and audit quality in Malaysia. Account-
ing Research Journal, 22, 167-195.
Zeckhauser, R. J. & Pound, J. (1990). Are large 
shareholders effective monitors? An investiga-
Social science section
314 Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com 
tion of share ownership and corporate perfor-
mance. Asymmetric information, corporate fi-
nance, and investment. University of Chicago 
Press.
